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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE MARYLAND BOULEVARD RULE: A TIME FOR
CHANGE
Maryland's boulevard rule has survived frequent challenge
and the apparent harshness of its results in recent cases.
The author examines the development and application of the
rule and questions both the historical bases and judicial
justifications for the rule's modern viability.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Several Maryland decisions in the past few years point once
again to the need for a critical re-evaluation of the Maryland
boulevard rule. 1 The stream of cases trying unsuccessfully to carve
exceptions into the rule continues, and while inequity is no stranger
to the application of this curious rule, the recent trend toward
absoluteness in its interpretation by the courts is disturbing.
In Creaser v. Owens,2 a school bus driver traveling on
Stewartown Road near Gaithersburg, Maryland, stopped at a stop
sign at the intersection of Stewartown and Goshen Roads and looked
carefully to the left and right. Seeing no other vehicles, she began
executing a left turn. A Cadillac traveling at an excessive speed on
Goshen Road flew over a hill about two hundred feet from the
intersection. 3 Although the bus driver was powerless to prevent the
collision that ensued, in her suit against the driver of the automobile
she was held negligent as a matter of law under the boulevard rule,
which precluded her recovery under contributory negligence
principles. 4
An even harsher application of, the rule is found in Hensel v.
Beckward. 5 On a moonless night, the driver of a car halted at an
intersection stop sign. After he and his passenger twice looked both
ways and observed no vehicles approaching on the intersecting
highway, the driver proceeded into the intersection where his car
was struck by a vehicle driven on the intersecting highway at high
speed without lights. 6 Permanently paralyzed, he also was held
negligent as a matter of law, thus barring his recovery.7
1. It has been over a decade since the last comprehensive analysis of the Maryland

2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

boulevard rule. Webb, Bothersome Boulevards, 26 MD. L.
[hereinafter cited as Bothersome Boulevards]'
267 Md. 238, 297 A.2d 235 (1972).
Id. at 241-43, 297 A.2d at 237-38.
Id. at 245, 297 A.2d at 239.
273 Md. 426, 330 A.2d 196 (1974).
Id. at 428, 330 A.2d at 198.
Id. at 432. 330 A.2d at 200.
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Perhaps the ultimate boulevard rule case was presented in
Johnson v. Dortch. 8 Johnson stopped his car at the stop sign posted
at a "T" intersection in Baltimore. He looked both ways and, seeing
no moving vehicles, began to execute a right tum. An accident
ensued with another driver whom the evidence indicated was
intoxicated, speeding, driving at night without headlights and
operating on thE; wrong side of the road. 9 Johnson, found to be
negligent as a matter of law, was precluded from recovery in his suit
against the other driver. lo
In each of these cases, a driver was held to have failed in an
absolute duty to yield the right of way to traffic favored by a stop
sign, and a finding of negligence was dictated by the boulevard rule.
II.

ORIGIN OF THE RULE

Under Maryland's boulevard rule, a driver who is legally
required to yield the right-of-way at an intersection (the unfavored
driver) to another (the favored driver) is held negligent as a matter of
law in the event. of an accident between the two within the
intersection, regaI:dless of relative speeds, times and distances. I I By
statute, a driver -approaching a through highwayl2 must yield the
right-of-way to vehicles on the through highway;13 a driver faced
with a stop sign. must yield the right-of-way to vehicles on the
intersecting road;14 a driver faced by a yield sign must yield the rightof-way ,to vehicles on the merging or intersecting road;15 a driver
who approaches a highway from a private drive must yield the rightof-way to vehicles on the highway;16 and a driver approaching a
road from a cros~ov~r must yield the right-of-way to vehicles on the
road. 17 The judicial construction and application of these statutory
requirements is t~e ~oulevard rule. 18 By analogy the rule has been
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.

16.
17.

18.

27 Md. App. 605, 342 A.2d 326 (1975).
Id. at 607-10, 342 A.2d at 328-30.
Id. at 617, 342 A.id at 333.
See, e.g., Creaser ,i. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 244, 297 A.2d 235, 238 (1972).
Through highway means every highway or portion thereof on which
vehicular traffic is given preferential right-of-way, and at the entrances
to which vehicular traffic from intersecting highways is required by law
to yield right-of-way to vehicles on such through highway in obedience to
either a stop sign, a yield sign or a yield-right-of-way sign when such
signs are erected as provided in this article.
MD. ANN. CODE art: 66 1,-2, § 1-198 (1970).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 1,-2, § 11-403(b) (1970).
Id. § 11-403(c).
Id. § 11-403(d).
Id. § 11-404.
Id. § 11-404.1.
.
The boulevard rule has been described as the judicial construction of MD. ANN.
CODE art. 66 1,-2, §§ 11-401 to 404.1 (1970). Tippett v. Quade, 19 Md. App. 49, 58, 309
A.2d 481, 487 (1973). See also Schwier v. Gray, 277 Md. 631, 632 n.1, 357 A.2d 100,
101 n.1 (1976). The judicial characterization of sections 11-401 and 11-402 as
falling within the ambit of the boulevard rule is misleading, however, because in
cases involving these sections, no automatic finding of negligence is imposed by
the court. See, e.g., Nardone v. Underwood, 219 Md. 326, 149 A.2d 13 (1959);
Meldrum v. Kellam Dist. Co., 211 Md. 504, 128 A.2d 400 (1957).
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extended to situations in which drivers enter roads from traffic
lights,19 parking lots 20 or other open areas. 21
As the Maryland Court of Appeals has stated the rule, when "an
unfavored driver is involved in an accident with a favored vehicle
under circumstances where the boulevard rule is applicable then in a
suit based on that collision the unfavored driver is deemed to be
negligent as a matter of law."22 The court of appeals has rigidly
adhered to the rule. As Judge Digges said, writing for the majority in
Hensel, "[l]ike the Rock of Gibraltar we remain firm and will not
allow [the boulevard rule] to be judically either bypassed or
otherwise eroded through new waves of attack."23 A scrutiny of the
origin and development of the boulevard rule reveals some
disconcerting leaps along the path to the rigid position taken by the
Maryland courts today.
Maryland's first right of way statute for motor vehicles
approaching intersections was enacted in 1916. 24 It simply stated:
"All vehicles shall have the right of way over other vehicles
approaching at the intersecting roads frOQ1 the left, and shall give
right of way to those approaching from the right."25 At a time when
traffic control devices were scarce and the few automobiles on the
roads were incapable of high speeds, this law seemingly attempted
to prevent accidents and assess blame for those that did occur. In the
cases arising under this statute, the circumstances of each accident
were considered in determining the negligence vel non of both
drivers. These circumstances included whether a right-of-way was
properly yielded,26 width of the roads,27 speeds of the vehicles,28
whether either driver was on the wrong side of the roadway,29 and
other factors.30 In short, there was no finding of negligence as a
matter of law, but rather, a weighing of the circumstances
surrounding each accident served as the basis for determining
liability.
When automobiles and traffic control signs became more widely
used and congestion became a problem, the legislature acted to allow
motorists on certain roads to travel continuously in preference to
19. Eastern Contractors v. State, 225 Md. 112, 169 A.2d 430 (1961), noted in 23 MD. L.
REV. 172 (1963) (red traffic light creates "boulevard" for driver proceeding on
green light); Cornias v. Bradley, 254 Md. 479, 255 A.2d 431 (1969) (flashing red
light creates boulevard).
20. Redmiles v. Muller, 29 Md. App. 304, 348 A.2d 291 (1975).
21. Victor A. Pyles Co. v. Rehmann, 21 Md-. App. 686, 691, 321 A.2d 175, 179 (1974)
("[T]hose who enter or cross a boulevard from fields or other curbs when no
roadway intersects" have been subjected to application of the rule).
22. Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 245, 297 A.2d 235, 239 (1972).
23. 273 Md. 426, 427, 330 A.2d 196, 197 (1974).
24. Law of April 18, 1916, ch. 687, § 163, 1916 Md. Laws 1605.
25. [d. This statute remains in force today. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 lh, § 11-401 (1970).
26. See, e.g., Chiswell v. Nichols, 137 Md. 291, 112 A. 363 (1920).
27. Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525, 135 A. 587 (1926).
28. [d.
29. Friedman v. Hendler Creamery Co., 158 Md. 131, 148 A. 426 (1930).
30. See, e.g., Chiswell v. Nichols, 137 Md. 291, 307, 112 A. 363, 368 (1920).
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vehicles traveling on intersecting roads. In 1929, several provisions
were added to the 19'16 right-of-way statute, one'of which authorized
the State Roads Commission to designate main or through highways
by erecting stop signs at the entrances to those highways from
intersecting roads. 31 A driver facing such a stop sign was required to
come to a full stop and yield the right-of-way to all drivers traveling
on the favored highway.32 This 1929 legislation included a similar
provision allowing motorists on paved .highways to proceed in
preference to those on unpaved highways.33 Once again, the
unfavored driver was required to come to a full stop and to yield the
right-of-way to all {irivers approaching on the favored highway.34
The language of the.1929 legislation was similar to the original 1916
statute in that both, required a yielding of the right-of-way to "all
vehicles" within ~ specified class, and neither made any mention of
speed, time, distance. or other factors. Yet the 1929 provisions served
as a judical springboard to the inflexible boulevard rule applied by
Maryland courts today. It seems odd that the later provisions have
been subjected to an interpretation differing so significantly from
that accorded the original statute when the legislature prefaced
neither with a sti'l,tement of purpose or intent. The only apparent
difference between the statutes is that in one case a driver must yield
the right-of-way to traffic approaching from a single direction and in
other cases he must yield the right-of-way to traffic coming from two
directions. Indeed, no legislative mandate 35 for a vastly differing
interpretation between the statutes is readily apparent.
The loose wOJ,"q~ng of the early boulevard cases makes them
susceptible to several interpretations. Typical of these early cases is
Blinder v. Monaghan,36 in which a taxi-cab driver, whose view of the
favored road waso~~tructed by a bus, obeyed a stop sign but did not
wait for the bus to move before he entered the intersection. He had
noticed a truck approaching behind the bus on the favored road but
lost sight of it whep the bus stopped. The cab proceeded into the
intersection and collided with the truck, which had by that time
passed the bus. 37 On these facts, the court found that the cab driver
had entered the favored road in disregard of his duty to stop and
yield the right-of-way. Although his vision was temporarily blocked
and his previous sighting of the truck had given him reason to
anticipate its approach, the cab driver proceeded blindly into the
intersection rather.. than waiting to ascertain whether the
31. Law of April 2, 1929, ch. 224, 1929 Md. Laws 616 (now codified in MD. ANN. CODE
art. 66 1/2, §§1-198, 1l-403(c), and 15-105(a».
32.Id.
33. Id. at 615.
34.Id.
35. The mandatory finding of negligence on the part of an un favored driver has been
called a "legislative mandate." Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426, 427, 330 A.2d
196, 197 (1974).
36. 171 Md. 77, 188 A. 31 (1936).
37. Id. at 81-83, 188 A. at 33-34.

/
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intersection was clear. The court drew an analogy to a case where a
driver ran a red light and collided with another driver who was
proceeding through a green light and had no opportunity to avert a
collision. 38 It was eminently clear to the court in both of these cases
that the proximate cause of the collisions was the unfavored driver's
disregard of "explicit and mandatory rules:"39 Under ordinary
standards of care and negligence principles, the court in Blinder at
this point had said enough to dispose of the case~ It went on to state,
however, that when such a disregard of explicit and mandatory rules
is found and a collision has ensued, "the collision can only be
attributed to [the unfavored driver's] negligence."4o Because of that
statement, Blinder was not to be remembered as just another
intersection accident case but rather as an earlY-formulation of the
boulevard rule. 41 Thus the court fell into the common legal trap of
making a statement that it considered to be a concise determination
of the particular case before it, but which lent-itself to sweeping
future application far beyond the contemplation of its issuers. Resort
to such a general statement was unnecessary'in Blinder because a
weighing of the individual circumstances could have pointed to no
other conclusion than that the unfavored cab" dnver was at fault.
Indeed, the court said "[n]either argument nonluthority are needed
to characterize such conduct as negligent."42 ;;
Upon a reading of Carlin v. Worthington/3 decided a year after
Blinder, it is apparent that a finding of negligence as a matter of law
whenever a favored and unfavored driver collide' at an intersection
was not contemplated by the court in Blinder.' Judge Sloan, writing
for the court, quoted the general rule stated in BUnder and explained
it as an accurate statement of the law but not· one which should be
made to the jury as an instruction. 44 Such an instruction would have
been deficient in not submitting to the jury the question of the
unfavored driver's violation of his duty to stop and yield the right-ofway as the proximate cause of the collision.
opinion indicated
that, depending upon such circumstances as the favored vehicle's
speed and distance from the intersection, whether the unfavored
driver came to a full stop before entering the iritersection, and the
degree to which his vision was obstructed- by a building, the
unfavored driver's alleged violation of duty ~ight not have been a

The

38. [d. at 84, 188 A. at 34 (citing Sun Cab Co. v, Faulkner, 163 Md. 477, 163 A. 194
(1932».
.
39, [d.
40. [d. The unfavored cab driver's negligence barred recovery in his suit against the
favored truck driver.
41. See, e.g., Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 244, 297 A.2d 235, 238 (1972) (citing
Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md. 77, 188 A. 31 (1936».
42. Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md, 77, 83, 188' A. 31, 34 '(1936).
43. 172 Md. 505, 192 A. 356 (1937). In Carlin, a favored truck driver sued the driver of
an unfavored vehicle which entered the favored roadway, where a collision
occurred.
44, [d. at 510, 192 A. at 358.
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cause of the accident: 45 "When the un favored driver has time, if the
favored driver is so far from the intersection that he will not arrive
there before the crossing is cleared by the other, if he is not speeding,
it is not negligence of an unfavored driver to enter.'?46 The un favored
driver must, however, have his vehicle under control so as to allow
him to yield the right-of-wayY Fault was properly to be determined
by a jury after weighing the attendant circumstances. This writer
can only speculate that if some of the more extreme boulevard cases
of recent years had come before the Carlin court in 1937, the court
would have weighed more carefully the predicament of unfavored
drivers whose vehicles were under control but who, because of the
conduct of the favored drivers or other circumstances, had little or no
opportunity to avert a collision.
It was in Greenfeld v. Hook 48 in 1939 that the court, while
maintaining that it· was merely following consistent case law,
actually tightened its stance on the duties of unfavored drivers.
Some of the court's language has achieved notoriety through its
frequent quotation:
The obvious and essential purpose of such rules is to
accelerate the flow of traffic over through highways by
permitting travellers thereon to proceed within lawful speed
limits without interruption. That purpose would be
completely frustrated if such travellers were required to slow
down at every intersecting highway . . . . If, however, the
relative rights of travellers on the two types of highway are
held to depend upon nice calculations of speed, time and
distance the rule would encourage recklessness and the
privilege of the uninterrupted travel would mean little more
than the privilege of having a jury guess in the event of a
collision whose guess was wrong. 49
The context in which the court noted the "obvious and essential
purpose" of the statutes requiring unfavored drivers to stop and
yield the right-of-way is worth mention. That statement was made in
disapproval of a proposed jury instruction to the effect that a favored
driver was required to reduce his speed when approaching street
crossings. 50 Clearly no such duty existed by statute or judicial
decision. When the language is read out of context,51 it appears that
45. Id. at 507, 192 A, at 357.
46. Id. at 508, 192 A, at 358 (emphasis added).
47.Id.
48. 177 Md. 116, 8 A,2d 888 (1939). In Greenfeld, an unfavored driver sued the driver.
of a favored vehicle for injuries sustained in a collision. On the facts of the case,
the unfavored driver was negligent, but the court held that her recovery would
not be precluded if the favored driver had a last clear chance to avert a collision.
49. Id. at 125-26, 8 A.2d at 892-93.
50. Id. at 120, 8 A.2d at 890.
51. These statements are often quoted without reference to their context. See, e.g.,
Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 246, 297 A,2d 235, 239 (1972) .

......
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requiring the favored driver to slow down at intersections was, in the
court's view, the sole alternative to a required finding of negligence.
While that inference is not supported by the text of the opinion, the
prohibition against "nice calculations of speed; 'time' and distance"
has effectively foreclosed the remaining alternative, a weighing of
the' circumstances surrounding a boulevard collision.
: Although the courts have not found it 'useful to quote this
language, ·Greenfeld went· on to say that the unfavored driver was
not 'negligent as a matter of law in proceeding.. from the median
access road into the favored driver's side of :the roadway.52 Her
negligence was in her admitted failure to look-in'the direction from
which oncoming traffic would approach after she entered that side of
the favored roadway.5.1 Greenfeld's use as precedent, however, has
been no different than if the court found the .. unfavored driver to
have been negligent as a matter of law simply because an accident
occurred. The court denied unfavored drivers the opportunity to
vindicate themselves by showing relative speeds, times and
distances; the prohibition against these "nice calculations'; deprived
unfavored drivers of the most effective means ofescaping a finding
of negligence. Thus Greenfeld and its progeny-have brought the
court( to the position it takes today. Whenever :the boulevard rule is
applicable, however, the required finding that"th~ un favored driver
is negligent as a matter of law is .said to ._be a "legislative
mandate."54
There is no basis in the right-of-way legislation nor its history
for holding the unfavored driver negligent as"a matter of law. The
rule was judicially created. Yet in Creaser, the-court stated "[i]f the
meaning and application of the 'boulevard rule!. is to be changed, it
must be done by the Legislature and not by judiCial fiat."55

III. APPLICATION OF THE RULE
When an unfavored driver has entered the.favored roadway and
merged into the flow of traffic before a collision ·occurs between his
vehicle and another on the favored road, he ha~' shed his status as
anunfavored driver and will escape application of the rule. 56 If a
question of merger is presented, the trier of fact decides whether the
accident occurred within the intersection or so dose to it that the
entering unfavored driver has interfered with the favored driver's
right-of-way into or through the intersectionY The threshold
question in each case, then, is whether an entry and merger have
52.
53.
.54.
55.
56.
.57.

177 Md. at 133. 8 A.2d at 896.
Id .
See note 35, supra.
267 Md. 238, 249, 297 A.2d 235, 241 (1972).
See, e.p., McCann v. Crum, 231 Md. 65. 188 A.2d 537 (1963) .
See Great Coastal Express v. Schruefer, _ Md. _ , _;369 A.2d 118, 127 (1977);
Paul v. Lyons, 34 Md. App. 93, 94. 366 A.2d 410, 411-12.
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taken place or, as it was so aptly put by Judge Liss writing for the
court of special appeals in Paul v. Lyons,58 "Is this a piece of the
Rock?"59
If the boulevard rule applies, the unfavored driver is negligent as
a matter of law. 60 This is so even though the conduct of the favored
driver, such as driving without lights at night, prevented the
unfavored driver from knowing of his presence in time to comply
with the duty to yield the right-of-way61 and even though the
unfavored driver's view may be blocked by topographical or other
visual obstructions. 62
In Creaser, the court of appeals subscribed to a concern voiced
by Judge Gilbert in his dissent in the lower appellate court. 63 Judge
Gilbert believed that if an unfavored driver whose vision of a
favored road was obstructed were to be relieved from a mandatory
finding of negligence and allowed to recover from a speeding favored
driver, favored drivers would be placed in the untenable position of
having to know in advance what obstacles would obscure the
unfavored driver's vision. 64 Thus, it was feared, the right-of-way
statutes would be rendered meaningless. 65 In adopting this
reasoning, the court of appeals in Creaser reviewed its substantial
number of boulevard rule opinions and found none in which there
was "any suggestion" that the topography of an area limiting the
unfavored driver's view of the boulevard would relieve him of the
absolute duty to yield the right-of-way.66
When Creaser is considered with such cases as Hensel and
Johnson, it becomes clear that neither topography of the area nor
any other circumstance beyond the control of an unfavored driver
will excuse him from the mandatory finding of negligence made by
Maryland courts today.
Greenfeld is often cited as precedent for the boulevard rule,6? but
that case contains certain qualifications. Mter noting that the
purpose of the boulevard statutes was to permit favored drivers to
proceed within lawfu"l speed limits,68 the Greenfeld court explained,
"[t]here are many situations in which the driver of an automobile
entering a favored from an unfavored highway may without
negligence be endang~red by traffic over and along the same."69 The
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

34 Md. App. 93, 366 A.2d 410 (1976).
[d. at 94, 366 A.2d at 411.
See note 11, supra.
See text accompanying notes 5-7, supra.
See text accompanying notes 2-4, supra.
267 Md. 238, 249-50, 297 A.2d 235, 241 (1972).
Owens v. Creaser, 14 Md. App. 593, 610, 288 A.2d 394, 403 (1972).
[d. at 610, 288 A.2d at403, cited in Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. at 249-50,288 A.2d
at 403.
267 Md. at 243, 297 A.2d at 238.
[d. at 246, 297 A.2d at 239.
See text accompanying note 49, supra.
177 Md. at 130, 8 A.2d at 894 (emphasis added).
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court gave examples of such situations: dense fog, children darting
out, mechanical failure and curves and grades which prevent a view
of approaching traffic. 70 This proviso, however, seems to have been
ignored in the intervening years. It was considered and dismissed ill
Creaser on the alternative grounds that it either was intended to
apply only to a last clear chance situation or authorized an exception
to the boulevard rule which later cases have eliminated. 71 Neither of
these explanations, however, fully disposes of the issue. The doctrine
of last clear chance is predicated upon negligence of both the
plaintiff and the defendant, the consequences of which the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid through the use of
ordinary care.72 With respect to its examples, the Greenfeld court
stated that the unfavored driver may be "without negligence." It is
thus unlikely that the examples were intended to apply only to last
clear chance situations. Assuming, on the other hand, that the
statement authorized an exception to the boulevard rule, if indeed
Greenfeld expounded such a rule, to say that the exception has been
whittled away by later cases is to say that the rule as it exists is
neither a legislative mandate nor an exclusively legislative matter.
When a favored driver sues an unfavored driver, the plaintiff
may be precluded from recovery if he is shown to have been
inattentive and thus contributorily negligent. 73 Likewise, the favored
driver may incur liability to parties other than the unfavored driver
by his contributory negligence. 74 These cases have been rare,
however, because of the prohibition against "nice calculations of
speed, time and distance" stemming from Greenfeld. 75 If, in order to
find the favored driver contributorily negligent, the jury must
indulge in these nice calculations, it is improper to submit that issue
to the jury.76 Kopitzki v. Boyd,77 however, recently limited this
prohibition. In that case, a passenger sued her host driver who was
the favored driver in a boulevard collision. Affirming a judgment for
the passenger, the court of appeals considered evidence of the host
driver's high speed and inattentiveness and concluded that it was
sufficient to overcome the prohibition against nice calculations. 78
The question of the favored driver's negligence was thus properly

70. Id. at 130, 8 A.2d at 894-95.
71. 267 Md. 238, 248, 297 A.2d 235, 240.
72. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 427-33 (1971). For a discussion of the doctrine of
last clear chance in the context of the boulevard rule, see Trionfo v. Hellman, 250
Md. 12, 241 A.2d 554 (1968).
73. See, e.g., Schwier v. Gray, 277 Md. 631, 357 A.2d 100 (1976). Contributory
negligence requires inattentiveness on the part of the favored driver. See
Kopitzki v. Boyd, 277 Md. 491, 355 A.2d 471 (1976).
74. See, e.g., Kopitzki v. Boyd, 277 Md. 491, 355 A.2d 471 (1976).
75. See text accompanying note 49, supra.
76. See, e.g., Tippett v. Quade, 19 Md. App. 49, 60-61, 309 A.2d 481, 489 (1973).
77. 277 Md. 491, 355 A.2d 471 (1976).
78. Id. at 497, 355 A.2d at 474-75.
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submitted to the jury. Kopitzki is significant in that it recognized
that the prohibition has some limit in Maryland courts. 79
'A month after Kopitzki, the court of appeals decided Schwier v.
Gray.80 In Schwier, a favored motocyclist collided with an unfavored
driver en~ering Annapolis Road, the favored highway. The favored
driver sued to recover damages from the unfavored driver. In
affirming a judgment for the unfavored driver, the court held that
the issue of the motorcyclist's contributory negligence was properly
submitted. to the jury.81 The court concluded that evidence of the
motorcyclist's negligence, including excessive speed and swerving
across lanes, was proper for the jury to consider.82 While, arguably,
the speed· and weaving of the favored driver may have been so
excessive or so erratic as to deprive the prohibition against nice
calculations of application in: this case under the Kopitzki rationale,
it is noteworthy that the court did not even pay lip service to the
.prohibition. On the contrary, the court based its approval of the
-submission of the. favored driver's contributory negligence to the
jury on this evidence simply on the traditional basis that reasonable
minds could have differed as to whether his conduct constituted
contributory negligence. 83
The prohibition against nice calculations has long been an
impediment to jury consideration of the favored driver's negligence.
-Read together, .Kopitzki and Schwier.indicate that favored drivers
may no longer be able to flaunt the rules of the road with virtual
impunity. In those- boulevard cases in which their negligence
contributes to the injury of some. party other than the unfavored
driver, . they' risk liability, and when they contribute to their own
injury, they maybe precluded from recovering from the unfavored
driver.
When sued by an unfavored driver, the favored driver may be
liable despite the unfavored' driver's contributory negligence if the
.doctrine of last clear: chance is applicable. 84 The prohibition against
nice calculations also applies in these situations, but even if the
prohibition has been relaxed, as recent cases would indicate, a
further complication stifles an unfavored driver's opportunity to
recover. In the context of a boulevard case, the doctrine of last clear
chance contemplates an act of negligence by the unfavored driver
which comes to an end, pladng him in peril which is realized by the
n~gligence ofthe favored dri\ier in failing to avoid the collision. 85 An
79. Judge Northrop, on the federal bench, had observed long before Kopitzki that
when calculations' of relative speeds, times and distances in boulevard cases are
not close, this prohibition is inapplicable. Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle Co., 206 F.
Supp. 120, 127 (D. Md. 1962).
80. 277 Md. 631, 357 A.2d 100 (1976).
81. [d. at 636, 357 A.2d at 103.
82. [d.
83. [d .•
84. See text accompanying note 72, supra.
8il. [d.
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unfavored driver will be continually negligent, however, from the
moment he enters the boulevard intersection until the moment of
collision. 86 This continuing negligence, which probably only a
mechanical failure or some other unique circumstance could
eliminate,87 is incompatible with a theory of recovery predicated
upon the favored driver's last clear chance. 88 Thus the doctrine holds
only a phantom hope for unfavored drivers.
Perhaps the most perplexing boulevard case of recent years is
Nicholson v. Page. 89 Nicholson seems to have avoided the rule
simply because its imposition would have had a very harsh result.
That case involved a westbound unfavored driver who stopped at a .
boulevard intersection and looked to his left. Traffic in the only
northbound lane was waiting behind a stopped bus. The unfavored
driver-plaintiff was waved on by the bus driver and moved his car
forward· to cross the· intersection, looking to his right to observe
southbound traffic on the boulevard. The defendant driver, who had
been waiting behind the bus, then swung around the bus on 'the
wrong side of the road to make a left turn at the intersection. The
vehicles of the plaintiff and defendant collided at the intersection. 90
The court of appeals affirmed a judgment for the unfavored driverplaintiff, concluding that a proper application of the boulevard rule
did not require a holding that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence
as a matter of law. 91 The affirmance was based, in part, on a lack of
foreseeability that the favored driver would pass the bus by traveling
in the southbound lane. 92 Surely it is no more foreseeable that a
favored driver will commit any of the other serious acts of negligence
with which boulevard cases have been replete. Perhaps Nicholson
recognized a relinquishment of the right-of-way by the favored
driver, or perhaps the court was simply moved by the predicament in
which the unfavored driver, who was a police officer,93 found
himself. Whatever its rationale, Nicholson has proved to be a
mirage, as the court has refused to extend its reasoning beyond a
virtual duplication of the particular facts of that case. 94

IV. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A significant majority of the states allow a finding that an
unfavored driver has yielded the right-of-way to favored traffic after
complying with a traffic control sign, even though an accident
occurs within the intersection between himself and a favored
86. See, e.g., Trionfo v. Hellman, 250 Md. 12, 241 A.2d 554 (1968).
87. See Bothersome Boulevards, supra note 1, at 121.
88.Id.
89. 255 Md. 659, 259 A.2d 319 (1969).
90. Id. at 660-61, 259 A.2d at 321.
91. Id. at 665, 259 A.2d at 323.
92. Id. at 667, 259 A.2d at 324.
93. Id. at 660, 259 A.2d at 321.
94. E.g., Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 247, 297 A.2d 235, 240 (1972).
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driver. 95 In these states, a case which, if brought in the Maryland
courts, would be subject to the boulevard rule is approached in the
same manner as non-boulevard rule automobile accident cases in
Maryland, that is, the negligence vel non of both drivers is
determined upon a consideration of all of the circumstances
surrounding the accident. 96 Of course, the unfavored driver may be
found negligent in such situations, but he is not held negligent as a
matter of law. For example, a case duplicating the facts of Creaser
has come before an Illinois district court97 and a case duplicating the
facts of Hensel before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 98 In both,
a jury verdict was affirmed for the plaintiff-unfavored driver who
was not found to be negligent himself.
The wording of many state right-of-way statutes, however, is
similar to that of the Uniform Vehicle Code, requiring that the rightof-way be yielded to vehicles which are already in the intersection or
are so close to the intersection as to constitute an "immediate
hazard."99 Under these statutes, the class of drivers to whom the
right-of-way must be yielded is limited by the words of the statute,
and courts are thus spared the decision of whether or not to supply a
limitation on· the basis of presumed legislative intent. Maryland's
intersection right-of-way statutes contain no such express limitation
and the courts have refused to supply one of their own accord.
Although the absence in other states of a mandatory finding of
negligence when a driver on the favored road was speeding might be
attributed to the "immediate hazard" language of the Uniform Code
provision, that provision does not explain the absence of mandatory
findings in other circumstances, such as in the case of unlit vehicles
or topographical obstructions to the unfavored driver's vision. A
favored vehicle may not be detectable by the un favored driver even
95. See generally Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 315, 315-25 (1965).
96. See, e.g., Safirstein v. Nunes, 241 Cal. App. 2d 416, 50 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1966).
97. Edmond v. Wertheimer Cattle Co., 19 Ill. App. 2d 389, 153 N.E.2d 870 (1958). An
unfavored entering driver sued a speeding favored driver who was hidden by a
hill and a curve before collision. A jury verdict for the unfavored driver was
affirmed.
98. Enfield v. Stout, 400 Pa. 6, 161 A.2d 22 (1960). Evidence that a favored driver did
not have his car under proper control and was driving without lights was held to
support a jury verdict in favor of the driver and occupants of the unfavored
vehicle.
99. UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 11-403(b)(Supp. 1970) (emphasis added):
Except when directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic signal, every
driver of a vehicle approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop
sign shall stop ... at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before
entering the' crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or, if none,
then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a
view of approaching traffic on the intersecting-roadway before entering
the intersection. After ... having stopped, the driver shall yield the
right of way to any vehicle which has entered the intersection from
another highway or which is approaching so closely on said highway as
to constitute an immediate hazard during the time when such driver is
moving across or within the intersection.
See also: id. (Historical Notes and Statutory Annotations are contained therein).
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when it is very close to the intersection. The difference in wording of
the right-of-way statutes, then, does not solely account for the
differences between the interpretations accorded them by Maryland
courts and those accorded them by the courts of other states.
The actions of the Maryland legislature with respect to the
relationship between motor vehicle law and the boulevard rule have
not been consistent. Had the legislature done nothing, that inaction
might have been read as a tacit approval of the rule as formulated
by the courts. lOO If, on the other hand, the legislature was inclined to
change the rule, it could have done several things. If it had added
the "immediate hazard" language of the Uniform Code,lOl limiting
the class of drivers to whom the unfavored driver was obligated to
yield the right-of-way, mandatory findings might have been
eliminated, at least when the favored driver was traveling significantly in excess of the speed limit. If it redefined the term "right-ofway" to conform to the Uniform Vehicle Code definition that only
those drivers who are proceeding lawfully are granted a preference
to proceed before other traffic,lo2 mandatory findings might have
been eliminated when the favored driver was guilty of a significant
violation of law. There are, of course, many other ways in which the
legislature could have modified the boulevard rule, but it is
reasonably certain that these two steps would have sent a clear
message to the courts that the legislature wanted the boulevard rule
changed.
What the legislature did in 1970 was to adopt substantially the
Uniform Vehicle Code's definition of "right-of-way"103 while, by the
same legislation, recodifying the right-of-way statutes which have
provided the judicial basis for the boulevard rule. 104 Although the
new definition of "right-of-way" seems incompatible with the
boulevard rule as it exists today, the legislature gave no indic~tion of
an intent to modify or eliminate the rule. The legislative will with
respect to the boulevard rule could certainly bear clarific~tion.

V. A DIVIDED JUDICIARY
A division among the ranks of the Maryland judiciary with
respect to the boulevard rule is made apparent by the way in which
the appellate courts have communicated with each other concerning
the rule. Both 9reaser and Hensel went to the court of special
appeals first, and the unfavored drivers were allowed recovery.105
100. Since Shriner v. Mullhousen, 210 Md. 104, 114-15, 122 A.2d 570, 575 (1956), the
Maryland courts have so read asserted legislative inaction.
101. See note 99, supra.
102. UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 1-156 (1968).
103. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 112, § 1-175 (1970).
104. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 112, §§ 11-401.1 to 11-403.
105. Beckward v. Hensel, 20 Md. App. 544, 316 A.2d 309 (1974); Owens v. Creaser, 14
Md. App. 593, 288 A.2d 394 (1972). The court of special appeals held that these
cases presented exceptions to the boulevard rule.
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These decisions were then reversed by the court of appeals, which
indicated that it would allow no exceptions to the boulevard rule. 106
Twice rebuffed, it is not surprising that the court of special appeals
applied the boulevard rule to preclude the unfavored driver from
recovering in Johnson,107 where the favored driver was chargeable
with an incredible array of simultaneous acts of negligence. The
court of appeals denied certiorari. lOB
It was undoubtedly with tongue well in cheek that Judge Liss,
speaking for the lower appellate court in Paul v. Lyons,109 said, "[w ]e
believe that our decision in this case does not disturb the pristine
beauty of the Rock and that the 'boulevard rule' remains the beacon
which our superiors intended it to be."llo
It may be of at least some encouragement to those who would
modify the boulevard rule that in Hensel, the court of appeals
applied the rule by only a four to two margin.11l In a dissenting
opinion concurred in by Judge Levine, Judge Smith argued that
when a favored driver conceals his presence on the highway from an
unfavored driver, an exception to the boulevard rule should be
recognized because a driver should not be held to a duty which
cannot be met.1l2 The judicial climate appears to be ripening for a
modification of this tenacious doctrine.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The term "right-of-way" was redefined in 1970 as part of a
massive revision of the Maryland Motor Vehicle Code,113 the
announced purpose of which was to parallel the format of the
Uniform Vehicle Code. 1l4 Formerly, "right-of-way" was defined in
Maryland as "the privilege of the immediate use of the highway."115
This was the statutory definition of the term in force throughout the
years during which the court formulated and fortified the boulevard
rule. In 1970, however, "right-of-way" was redefined as "the right of
one vehicle or pedestrian to proceed in a lawful manner in preference
to another vehicle or pedestrian."1l6
While there is no evidence that the legislature intended to
change the boulevard rule with this new language, the arguable
import of the new definition is that by proceeding in an unlawful
106. Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426, 330 A.2d 196 (1974); Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md.
238, 297 A.2d 235 (1972).
107. 27 Md. App. 605, 342 A.2d 326 (1975).
108. Id. at 606, 342 A.2d at 326.
109. 34 Md. App. 93, 366 A.2d 410 (1976).
110. Id. at 98, 366 A.2d at 414.
111. 273 Md. 426, 330 A.2d 196 (1974).
112. Id. at 432-33, 330 A.2d at 200-01.
113. Forward to MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, PROPOSED
MARYLAND MOTOR VEHICLE LAws REVISION (1969).
114. Id. Compare UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 1-156 (1968) with MD. ANN. CODE
art. 66 112, § 1-175 (1970).
115. MD. ANN. CODE art 661f2, § 2(45) (1957).
116. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 112, § 1-175 (emphasis added).
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manner, one might forfeit the right to proceed "in preference to
another vehicle or pedestrian." Without question, there are minor
violations of law that ought not deprive a favored driver of his rightof-way, such as driving with a cracked window or broken turn
signal. But in the many boulevard cases in which a favored driver
has been guilty of significant violations of law such as intoxication,
reckless speeding, failing to use lights at night, driving on the wrong
side of the road or a combination of the above, he should be denied
an absolute preference over other drivers by the very definition of
the term "right-of-way." To date neither Maryland appellate court
has taken cognizance of this definitional change as it relates to the
boulevard rule. Objectively, though, the court of appeals is unlikely
to change the boulevard rule on the basis of this redefinition alone.
The court has so locked itself in by its decisions in the seven years
since this redefinition was enacted· that to grasp it now as a
legislative change of the rule would place the court in the awkward
position of having to explain why it did not take cognizance of the
change earlier.
If the legislature were to add to the intersectional right-of-way
statutes the express qualification of the Uniform Vehicle Code that
the class of vehicles on the favored road to which the right-of-way
must be yielded are those already in the intersection or close enough
thereto to constitute an immediate hazard, the court might then feel
free at least to limit application of the rule. ll7
In view of the legislature's inaction, however, if the Maryland
boulevard rule is to be abrogated, the onus must ultimately lie on the
court of appeals, which created the rule. Neither the previously
existing right-of-way statutes nor the legislative history of the
statutes through which the rule is applied lend any support to it. The
process by which the court has come to assume its current stance is
best characterized as "bootstrapping." The court has gradually
created a rule of law, ascribed it to the legislature without warrant
and then finding support for it in the legislature's failure to act.
This straw foundation is meager support for so staunch a rule of law.
In non-boulevard automobile accident cases, the jury is
permitted to weigh the relevant facts and circumstances in
determining any negligence of the parties. If the jury is competent to
117. During the 1976 session of the Maryland legislature, three bills were proposed
which would have altered the boulevard rule, but all failed: H. 1853, "Motor
Vehicles·Boulevard Rule," February 26, 1976 (this was a curious proposal, simply
requiring the favored driver to operate his vehicle in a "prudent and careful
manner"); S. 703, "Motor Vehicles·Boulevard Rule," February 17, 1976 (this
proposal would have adopted "immediate hazard" language qualifying the
boulevard rule statutes); H. 932, "Vehicle Laws·'Boulevard Rule'," January 21,
1976 (this proposal would have prohibited construing the boulevard statutes
against an unfavored driver when the favored driver's conduct concealed his
presence).
The only boulevard rule bill in the 1977 session was a virtual re-write of S.
703 of the 1976 session. S. 367, "Motor Vehicles-Boulevard Rule," January 25,
1977, also failed.
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do so in these cases, it is also competent to do so iIi boulevard cases.
There is nothing inherent in the nature of a boulevard case which
requires that a jury's determination be preempted by a mandatory
finding of negligence imposed by the court. On the contrary, there is
strong reason why a mandatory finding of negligence on the part of
an unfavored driver should not be made. Favored drivers should be
encouraged to obey traffic laws, and a rule which, in effect, relieves
them of liability when they have not done so removes a powerful
incentive for complying with these laws. Abolishing the rule would
also avoid the harsh results which obtain when a driver is held to a
duty which he cannot meet, such as when the favored driver's
conduct or some physical circumstance has prevented an entering
driver from knowing of a favored vehicle's presence on the roadway.
The courts should treat boulevard cases like other automobile
accident cases, entrusting to the triers of fact the determination of
negligence vel non based on a consideration of the relevant
circumstances including relative speeds, times and distances. This
may be done with the knowledge that Maryland's right-of· way
statutes will not thus be rendered meaningless, as was feared in
Creaser, 118 unless right-of-way statutes in force in the majority of
states in this country are also meaningless.

John William Debelius III
ADDENDUM
Since the initial printing of this article, the Maryland Court of
Appeals has filed its opinions in Dean v. Redmiles, No. 24 (Ct. App.,
April 19, 1977) and Covington v. Gernert, No. 69 (Ct. App., May 31,
1977). Both cases will be of major consequence in the application of
the boulevard rule.
In the context of a suit against the estate of a favored driver
brought on behalf of his passenger, it 'was held in Dean that in a suit
by a passenger of the favored or unfavored driver against the
favored driver, a jury question as to the negligence vel non of the
favored driver is presented by evidence of his excessive speed if it
was a proximate cause of the accident. Apparently, this is so without
regard to the dependence of such evidence upon nice calculations of
speed, time and distance. In Dean, the speed of the favored driver
was variously estimated between five and twenty miles per hour in
excess of the posted fifty mile per hour speed limit. In its discussion,
the court seemed to imply that the prohibition against nice
calculations is nothing more than a supportive statement for the
principle that contributory negligence as a matter of law bars the
unfavored driver's recovery in a suit against the favored driver.
118. See text accompanying notes 63-65, supra.
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Thus, the court of appeals reversed the decision of the court of
special appeals in Redmiles v. Muller, 29 Md. App. 304, 348 A.2d 291
(1975).
Chief Judge Murphy dissented vigorously from the Dean
majority opinion, viewing it as a major departure from prior cases
which had made inattention of the favored driver a requisite to his
liability. "Inattention" had always required a showing of more than
mere excessive speed. See, e.g., Harper v. Higgs, 255 Md. 24, 169
A.2d 661 (1961). Judge Murphy foresaw the abandonment of the
"eminently sensible" prohibition against nice calculations of speed,
time and distance in all boulevard cases and the "unfortunate"
downfall of the favored driver from his exalted position in that
liability may now be predicated merely upon evidence of his
excessive speed.
It is Covington, however, which has the potential to severly
restrict application of the boulevard rule. The defendant was
driving the wrong way on a one-way favored street. The plaintiff,
approaching an intersection with the through street, obeyed a stop
sign, looked in the direction from which traffic would have been
expected, and proceeded into the intersection where a collision
occurred. A judgment for the plaintiff obtained in the district court
was reversed on appeal by the Baltimore City Court, which held the
boulevard rule applicable and, thus, the plaintiff guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. In vacating and
remanding, the court of appeals grasped the legislative redefinition
of the term "right-of-way" (see notes 113-16, supra, and
accompanying text) seven years after its enactment to hold that
since the defendant was not proceeding "in a lawful manner," the
boulevard rule did not apply and the plaintiff was not contributorily
negligent as a matter of law.
Although the general import of its decision is clear - that a
driver on a favored road may forfeit his absolute right-of-way and
the protection of the boulevard rule by proceeding unlawfully - the
question which the court must now face is what conduct, other than
driving the wrong way on a one-way street, will constitute
proceeding unlawfully? An argument can doubtless be made in
many boulevard cases that the favored driver waS'violating some
statute or other and was, therefore, proceeding unlawfully. The
courts may no longer stand firm "like the Rock of Gibraltar," but
must now involve themselves in the complexities of determining
upon all the facts of a given case whether the favored driver has lost
his preference to proceed and, thus, whether the boulevard rule
applies at all. Guidelines must be formulated, and it is difficult to
perceive how this might be done other than on a case by case basis.
As a general rule, violation of a statute is not evidence of
negligence unless the violation was a proximate cause of the injury
complained of. Dean v. Redmiles, supra. Perhaps it will be argued by
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analogy that the violation of a statute should not constitute
proceeding unlawfully unless the violation was a proximate cause of
the collision. The problem with that approach is that it gives rise to
the implication that where the favored driver's conduct is not the
proximate cause of a collision, he must have been proceeding
lawfully no matter how he operated his vehicle. On the other hand,
the court might adopt the approach that any significant violation of
law by the favored driver will render the boulevard rule inapplicable.
In short, no single, easy solution to the dilemma presents itself.
Although the language of the "new" right-of-way statute is taken
from the Uniform Vehicle Code, note 102 supra, the decisions of
other states are not likely to be helpful to Maryland's courts because
other states do not have a boulevard rule.
If Dean and Covington are indicative of a trend, a judicial
abrogation of the boulevard rule may be in the offing. For the
present, however, the boulevard rule has not been renounced; its
scope of application has been limited to an extent which must await
determination.

